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Abstract 
 
In this paper the impact of market reforms on economic growth has been analyzed using the panel 
data for 26 post-socialist economies over the period between 1989 and 2005. Taking into account 
the dynamic properties of the data, the concepts of cointegration and equilibrium correction model 
for panel data has been used as the analytical framework. First, well-specified regression models 
have been obtained. Second, long and short run aspects of ‘reforms-growth’ relationship have been 
considered. Out analysis has detected the existence of cointegration between the level of ERBD 
reform index and the level of real GDP per capita. This is interpreted as the presence of the long run 
relationship between these indicators. Third, it has been found that there is a statistically significant 
positive influence of economic reforms on economic growth in the long run. In addition, market 
reforms positively influence economic growth in the short-run, but with a one-year lag. The 
equilibrium correction mechanism in corresponding regressions reflects existing biases of the 
analyzed indicators from the equilibrium trajectory, as well as direction and speed of adjustment to 
this trajectory. Our approach to modeling of the relationship between market reforms and economic 
growth explains a puzzle of high rates of economic growth in some countries with a relatively low 
level of ERBD reform index. Finally, in contrast to other studies employing a different 
methodology, statistically significant influence of economic growth on market reforms has been 
established both in the long and short run, our study shows that there is no such relationship. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
The superiority of market economy over centralized planning has been historically ‘verified’ by the 
collapse of socialism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
Additionally, the transition of the former socialist countries to a market economy provides further 
empirical evidence of the impact of economic freedom on economic growth. Over the last decade, 
this evidence has been extensively studied. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship 
between the progress in market reforms and economic growth in post-socialist economies taking 
into consideration the properties of the available time series and using state of the art econometric 
techniques. 
 
Our analysis establishes that the level of the EBRD index of market reforms and the level of real 
GDP per capita are integrated variables with an order of integration I(1). Moreover, these variables 
are cointegrated, which indicates the existence of a long-run relationship between them and an 
equilibrium trajectory of economic growth determined by market reforms. Accordingly, an 
equilibrium correction model can be utilized in order to analyze the relationships between market 
reforms and economic growth. In the regression models, the equilibrium correction mechanism 
reflects the discrepancy between the level of market reforms and the level of economic growth and 
a movement towards the steady-state trajectory correcting disequilibrium states as well. 
 
The main findings of our study are as follows. First, market reforms exert a statistically significant 
positive influence upon economic growth in the long run. At the same time, a positive influence of 
market reforms on economic growth in the short run is also found, with a one-year lag. However, in 
contrast to some other studies where different a methodology is used, we have found no statistically 
significant feedback between market reforms and economic growth. In other words, economic 
growth does not influence market reforms, both in the long-run, and in short-run.   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decades, the empirical relationship between economic freedom and growth has been 
extensively studied. Theoretically, the analysis is grounded on the classical liberalism of Adam 
Smith, and the works of Hayek (1960), Friedman (1962), Buchanan (1975), and some other authors. 
These authors share a view that economic freedom promotes profit-seeking resulting in bigger 
‘wealth of nations’. In contrast, economic policies repressing economic freedom restrict economic 
growth and development. This argument is supported empirically by numerous studies used various 
indexes of economic freedom. The superiority of market economy over centralized planning has 
been historically ‘verified’ by the collapse of socialism in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR. Additionally, the transition of the former socialist countries to a 
market economy provides additional empirical evidence of the impact of economic freedom on 
economic growth. 
 
Currently a dataset needed to explore the impact of market reforms on economic growth in post-
socialist countries is sufficiently large. For these countries various indexes characterizing the level 
of economic freedom are also available. In this study we consider only a set of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition indicators, characterizing progress in 
market reforms. We do not discuss whether they adequately characterize the depth of market 
reforms or not. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between the progress in market 
reforms and economic growth taking into consideration the properties of the available time series 
and using state of the art econometric techniques. 
 
Despite the voluminous body of econometric studies pointing to the positive influence of economic 
reforms on growth (see, for instance, Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) for a review), there are 
still controversies over several aspects of this issue. In particular, Babetskii and Campos (2007) 
considered the results of 43 econometric studies of the relationships between market reforms and 
growth in transition economies using meta-regression analysis. The results of this analysis shows 
that of 321 coefficients characterizing the effects of reforms on economic growth, approximately 
one third is positive and statistically significant, another third is negative and statistically 
significant, and the final third of these coefficients is statistically insignificant. The authors explain 
such evidence by a range of factors, including the model specification, modeling techniques, and 
the endogeneity problem of reforms vis-à-vis economic growth. In our study, special attention is 
paid to these issues. 
 
The peculiarity of practically all studies of ‘reforms-growth’ nexus is that dynamic characteristics 
of the data are not taken into consideration (with exception of the papers by Staehr (2006) and Fish, 
Choudhry (2007)) dealing with the relationship between political and economic reforms). In this 
study, we attempt to fill this gap. This task has required an essential revision of specification of 
regression models and approach to the analysis of endogeneity of analyzed variables. 
 
A distinctive feature of our study is the application of the concept of cointegration and equilibrium 
correction model (Engle, Granger (1987)) for the panel data for analysis of ‘reforms-growth’ 
relationship. This approach enables, on the one hand, a more correct specification of appropriate 
regression models and, on the other hand, consideration of both the short-run and long-run 
relationship between market reforms and economic growth. 
 
The main objectives of this study are: (i) estimation of the dynamic characteristics of the data (the 
panel tests for unit root and stationarity) and choice of a method of econometric analysis; (ii) 
analysis of the long-run relationship between market reforms and economic growth (panel 
cointegration test); (iii) choice of the specification of the econometric model characterizing the 
relationship between market reforms and economic growth (equilibrium correction model) and an   4
estimation of short-run and long-run impact of market reforms on economic growth; (iv) analysis of 
the interrelationship between market reforms and economic growth (problem of endogeneity of the 
analyzed variables) 
 
The paper has the following structure. In the second section we offer a critical review of existing 
approaches to the modeling of the relationships between market reforms and growth, we explicate 
our analytical framework, and formulate major hypotheses. In the third section, the empirical data 
are described and their dynamic characteristics investigated by using panel tests for unit root and 
stationarity. The fourth section discusses the results of econometric analysis of the relationships of 
‘reforms-growth’ nexus. The final section concludes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The empirical analysis of the relationships between market reforms and economic growth in the 
transition economies goes back to 1996. Falcetti, Lysenko, and Sanfey (2006) provide a 
comprehensive survey of the literature on the topic. Early studies stress a number of essential 
preconditions for a sustainable economic growth: (1) initial conditions; (2) macroeconomic 
stabilization leading to low inflation; (3) comprehensive economic reforms, including price and 
trade liberalization, small-scale privatization, and deep institutional reforms, such as enterprise 
restructuring, financial sector policy, and competition policies (Fischer et al. (1996); Fischer, Sahay 
(2000; 2004); De Melo et al. (2001); Havrylyshyn, van Rooden (2003)). A number of authors pay 
attention to the problem of endogeneity (Heybey, Murrell (1999); Berg et al. (1999)) suggesting that 
not only reforms affect economic growth, but also reverse relationships are observed, in particular, 
higher rates of growth induce further economic reforms. 
 
Recently, there is a consensus on at least three major points. First, macroeconomic stabilization is 
considered to be a necessary condition for recovery and growth. Second, the role of initial 
conditions seems to be declining over time. Third, the influence of structural reforms is strong and 
robust. Nevertheless, controversies over ‘reforms-growth’ nexus still exist (Falcetti, Lysenko and 
Sanfey (2006); Babetskii, Campos (2007)). 
 
The most recent publications that use the latest available data are the most interesting to look at. 
One of such papers by EBRD researchers (Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006)) concludes that a 
robust relationship between reforms and growth exists in transition economies with a one-year lag. 
Although similar results are typical for many other studies, in several papers such a relationship is 
called into question (see, for example, Radulescu, Barlow (2002)). However, in their paper, Falcetti, 
Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) emphasize that such skepticism is subject to wrong specification of the 
models; in particular, when different indexes of reforms are included in the model, this leads to the 
multicolinearity problem. They also stress that the relationship ‘market reforms – economic growth’ 
in transition countries is complex: besides market-oriented reforms other factors affect economic 
growth. Additionally, Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) conclude that there is probably an 
interrelationship between market reforms and economic growth, i.e. reforms have a positive 
influence on economic growth which, in turn, leads to further economic liberalization. Since the 
paper of Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), in our view, is one of the most comprehensive on this 
issue (in the context of the used data set, and utilized econometric methods), we will consider this 
paper as a starting point of our further analysis. 
 
The vast majority of papers dealing with the ‘reforms-growth’ relationship usually employ the 
following specification of panel regression equations: 
  ,0 1 , 1 , (/ ) ( ) , it it it Y Y a a ref control and dummy variables ε − ∆= + + +  (1) 
  ,0 1 , 1 2 , , (/ ) ( ) , it it it it Y Y a a ref a ref control and dummy variables ε − ∆= + + ∆ + +  (2)   5
  ,0 1 , 1 , (/ ) ( ) , it it it Y Y a a ref control and dummy variables ε − ∆= + ∆ + +  (3) 
where Yi,t is real GDP per capita of country i at time t; (∆Y/Y)i,t is annual growth of real GDP per 
capita of country i at time t; refi,t–1 is index of market reforms of country i at time t–1; ∆refi,t and 
∆refi,t–1 are growth of index of market reforms of country i at time t and t–1, respectively; a0, a1, a2 
are regression coefficients; εi,t are regression residuals. Control variables can include indicators 
characterizing initial conditions and macroeconomic environment as well as other factors affecting 
economic growth. 
 
The use of both levels and growth rates of variables in the regression equations (equation (2)) has 
already been criticized in De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm (2005). However, in our view there is 
another important aspect concerning model specification, namely the problem of a balanced 
regression. In particular, the left-hand and the right-hand left variables of the regression model 
should have the same order of integration. For instance, in the equation (1) annual growth rate of 
real GDP per capita can be a stationary variable. At the same time, the level of market reforms 
index can appear to be non-stationary. It is well-known that the use of level variables in the 
regression model could lead to the problem of spurious regression. In addition, if only growth rates 
of variables are included in regression, then there is a danger of loss of long-run information 
contained in the data. All these issues lead us to utilize the concept of cointegration in order to 
investigate the relationships between reforms and growth. 
 
If the level of real per capita GDP (Yi,t) and the level of market reforms index
1 (refi,t) are variables 
with order of integration I(1), then it is very likely that a long-run relationship can exist between 
them. Let Yi,t be a function of refi,t, then the relationship between them can be expressed as Yi,t –
 f(refi,t) = εi,t. If variables Yi,t and refi,t are non-stationary with order of integration I(1), while the 
residuals  εi,t are stationary, then the variables  Yi,t and  refi,t are cointegrated. The concept of 
cointegration is the statistical expression of the economic concept of equilibrium, so it can be 
applied to investigate long-run relationship between economic growth and market reforms. The 
residuals  εi,t characterize deviations of a level of real GDP per capita from the equilibrium 
trajectory. Their stationarity denotes the existence of the equilibrium correction mechanism that 
restores the equilibrium level of real GDP per capita. 
 
Cointegration between economic growth and market reforms supposes causality at least in one 
direction, and the existence of an appropriate equilibrium correction model (Engle, Granger 
(1987)). Accordingly, this model allows us to conduct an analysis of both long-run and short-run 
relationships between market reforms and economic growth. In contrast to the paper by Falcetti, 
Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) that uses specification (1), we suggest the following methodology to 
analyze the ‘reforms-growth’ nexus: 
 
1.  The analysis of the order of integration of the data used (panel tests for unit root and 
stationarity) is conducted. 
 
2.  If variables have the order of integration I(1), i.e. they are non-stationary in the levels and 
stationary in the first differences, the following model is applied to test for cointegration and to 
estimate the parameters of the long-run relationship: 
  ,, , , , it i t it it it ya r e f R E C O V δ βϕ ε =++ + +  (4) 
where yi,t is the level (logarithmic) of real per capita GDP of country i at time t, αi are individual 
effects, δt are period effects, refi,t is the value of market reforms index of country i at time t, βi is 
regression coefficient which characterizes an impact of refi,t on yi,t in the long-run, RECOVi,t is a 
                                                 
1 See section 3.1 for details.   6
variable, characterizing the influence of factors affected in the period of recovery growth, and εi,t 
are the regression residuals. If the residuals εi,t are stationary, then yi,t and refi,t are cointegrated, i.e. 
there is a long-run relationship between them. The residuals εi,t characterize deviations of yi,t from 
an equilibrium trajectory. 
 
3.  If there is a cointegration between the logarithmic level of real GDP per capita and the value 
of market reforms index, the analysis of the relationships between market reforms and economic 
growth can be carried out within the framework of the following equilibrium correction model: 
  ,, 1 , 1 , , 1 , , µ ϕγ δ α ε −− − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + it it it it it it yy r e f R E C O V u  (5) 
where  ∆yi,t = yi,t – yi,t–1;  ∆refi,t = refi,t – refi,t–1;  ∆RECOVi,t = RECOVi,t – RECOVi,t–1;  εi,t–1 is 
equilibrium correction mechanism; αi are the feedback coefficients, characterizing the speed of 
equilibrium correction; µ, ϕ, γ, δ are the regression coefficients; uit are the regression residuals. 
 
The equation (5) is the balanced regression, in which all of the variables (both the left-hand and the 
right-hand ones) are stationary. In the case of cointegration, coefficient α at the equilibrium 
correction mechanism is both negative and statistically significant. If α ≠ 0 (equation (5)), then 
market reforms produce an impact on economic growth over the long-run; if γ ≠ 0, the impact lasts 
only in the short run. When α ≠ 0 and γ ≠ 0, market reforms influence economic growth both in the 
long-run and short-run. 
 
4.  If there is no cointegration between yi,t and refi,t, the analysis of ‘reforms-growth’ nexus 
should be carried out using the following specification: 
  ,, 1 , 1 , , . µ ϕγ δ −− ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + it it it it it yy r e f R E C O V u  (6) 
In this case regression is also a balanced one, thereby reflecting the existence of a short-run 
relationship only. 
 
5.  In case of cointegration between yi,t and refi,t the analysis of exogeneity (endogeneity) and 
causality between the variables is carried out by using the Granger test within the following system 
the regression equations: 
  ,1 1 , 1 1, 1 1 ,1 , 1 1 , , µ ϕγ δ α ε −− − ∆=+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + it it it it it it yy r e f R E C O Vu  (7a) 
  ,2 2 , 1 2, 1 2 , 2 , 1 2 , . µ ϕγ δ α ε −− − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + it it it it it it ref y ref RECOV u  (7b) 
If in the equation (7b) ϕ2 ≠ 0, and α2 = 0, the variable is refi,t is weakly exogenous relative to yi,t. It 
means that the value of the market reforms index does not depend on the level of real GDP per 
capita in the long-run, but in the short-run the relationship still exists. When ϕ2 = 0, and α2 = 0, then 
the variable refi,t is strongly exogenous relative to yi,t. In this case the value of the market reforms 
index depends on the level of real GDP per capita neither in the long run nor in the short run. There 
is an interrelationship between economic growth and market reforms (i.e. endogeneity of the 
variables), if α2 ≠ 0 (long-run interrelationship), ϕ2 ≠ 0 (short-run interrelationship), α2 ≠ 0 and ϕ2 ≠ 
0 (interrelationship both in the long-run and short-run). 
 
Given all of the abovementioned considerations, the following major hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
1.  The level (logarithmic) of real GDP per capita and the level of market reforms index are the 
non-stationary variables with the order of integration I(1). Therefore, the first differences of these 
variables are stationary with the order of integration I(0). 
 
2.  The level (logarithmic) of real GDP per capita and the level of the market reforms index are   7
cointegrated. In other words, market reforms influence economic growth in the long-run. 
 
3.  Market reforms influence economic growth in the short-run. 
 
4.  The relationship between market reforms and economic growth can be expressed by using an 
equilibrium correction model that characterizes both the long-run and short-run aspects of such a 
relationship. 
 
5.  Market reforms and economic growth are interrelated, i.e. the investigated variables are 
endogenous. 
 
It has to be noted that the hypotheses specified above correspond to a large extent to the results 
presented in Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), specifically: a positive influence of market 
reforms on economic growth, an influence of market reforms on economic growth with a one year 
lag, endogeneity of economic growth and market reforms. But in this study, the independent 
variable (real per capita GDP growth rate) is probably a stationary variable, while the main 
independent variable (EBRD index of market reform), is evidently a non-stationary variable. As a 
result, there is a problem of specification (unbalanced regression). Our approach to analyzing the 
relationship between reforms and growth suggests ways of solving this problem along with 
investigating relationship between variables not only in the short run, but also in the long run. 
 
3. THE DATA AND ITS DYNAMIC PROPERTIES 
 
3.1. The data 
 
Data from 26 post-socialists countries
2 for the period 1989–2005 (balanced panel)
3 were used in this 
study. The analyzed indicators and their sources are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The data 
 
Abbreviation Indicator  Source 
GDPPC  GDP per capita in constant 
Euros of 2000 
Estimates on the basis of the EBRD data
1 (real GDP growth rates), World 
Economic Outlook
2 (GDP level in 2000, USD), Eurostat
3 (average exchange 
rate EUR/USD in 2000), and World Development Indicators
4 (population) 
EBRD transition indicators:
5 
CP Competition  policy  EBRD 
BRIRL  Banking reform and interest 
rate liberalization 
EBRD 
ER Enterprise  restructuring    EBRD 
PL  Price liberalization  EBRD 
SMNB  Securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions 
EBRD 
SSP  Small scale privatization  EBRD 
TFES  Trade and Forex system  EBRD 
OIR  Overall infrastructure reform EBRD 
LSP  Large scale privatization  EBRD 
EBRD  EBRD market reforms index Estimations on the basis of EBRD data (arithmetic average from nine 
EBRD indexes of transformation) 
Notes: 
                                                 
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina is excluded from the list of countries which are analyzed in the EBRD Transition Reports 
since the data on GDP growth for this country are available only since 1996 and cause certain doubts. Thus, the 
following countries were analyzed: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. 
3 For all objects there is the same number of observations.   8
1 http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/sei.xls. 
2 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx, the database of September 2006. 
3 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/. 
4 http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/. For Serbia and Montenegro the data exclude Kosovo-Metohija; for 1989–
1997 the data are estimated on the basis of population growth in the Yugoslav Federation as a whole. 
5 http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/tic.xls. 
 
In contrast to numerous papers on economic growth in post-socialist countries, the level of real 
GDP per capita (as a measure of growth) is used in this paper, instead of GDP growth rates. This 
indicator has been calculated on the basis of the growth rates data collected by the European Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). These data are also used in similar studies. As for the 
measure of progress in market reforms, the EBRD indexes of transformation are used. The value of 
the index varies from 1 up to 4+ (‘1’ is to denote a Soviet-type economy, while ‘4 +’ means the 
standards and characteristics of a developed market economy, see, for example, EBRD (2006) for a 
detailed description of the approach). It has to be noted that an assessment with a negative sign 
means the value of the index ‘minus 1/3’, while for a positive sign the value of the index ‘plus 1/3’ 
is used. Accordingly, the values of the index of transformation range from 1.00 to 4.33. 
 
In order to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity different EBRD indexes of transformation are 
not included as right hand variables in the regressions simultaneously (Staehr (2005), Falcetti, 
Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), Chubrik (2003)). These indexes are closely correlated with each other 
(the minimal and average coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.56 and 0.82 respectively). To solve 
this problem, some authors propose utilization of factor analysis (method of principal components) 
which allows obtaining the factors (components) which have been not correlated with each other. 
The factor analysis is conducted, as a rule, for eight out of nine EBRD indexes of reforms 
(excluding overall infrastructure reform); then the obtained factors are used in the equations of 
growth. In our study the factor analysis (method of principal components) was conducted for nine 
indexes of reforms
4 (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Principal components of EBRD transition indicators 
 
Components:   
PC 1  PC 2  PC 3  PC 4  PC 5  PC 6  PC 7  PC 8  PC 9 
Eigenvalues  7.18 0.68 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.07 
Variance proportion  0.80  0.08  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Variable Eigenvectors  (loadings): 
CP  0.32  –0.34 0.70  –0.25  –0.11 0.34  –0.19  –0.24 0.01 
BRIRL 0.35  –0.11  –0.27  0.07  –0.30 –0.11 –0.07 –0.24 –0.79 
ER  0.35 –0.05 –0.26 –0.48 –0.24 –0.27  0.42 –0.34  0.41 
PL  0.30 0.58 0.38 0.35  –0.08 0.06 0.54 0.02  –0.08 
SMNB  0.32  –0.48 0.19 0.24 0.08  –0.55 0.11 0.49 0.06 
SSP  0.34  0.31  0.04 –0.03  0.64 –0.34 –0.39 –0.33  0.03 
TFES  0.34 0.32  –0.12 0.09  –0.52 0.03  –0.56 0.29 0.31 
OIR  0.33  –0.31  –0.36 0.54 0.21 0.47 0.07  –0.20 0.27 
LSP  0.34 0.09  –0.20  –0.48 0.34 0.39 0.12 0.55  –0.18 
 
Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between economic growth and reforms 
as a whole (instead of their separate components) the variable ‘EBRD market reforms index’, 
calculated as an arithmetic average of indexes, will be used in the further analysis. The utilization of 
such a variable seems reasonable because the first factor explains 80% of the variation of the 
analyzed indexes and the factor loadings of the indexes entering into this factor are practically 
identical and equal to approximately 1/3. 
 
                                                 
4 The calculations have been done using EViews 6.0.   9
The figures A1–A26 in the Appendix show that all transition economies investigated in our research 
demonstrate the U-shaped dynamics of real GDP per capita. At the beginning of transition, 
structural distortions inherited from the socialist past had been corrected in the course of adaptation 
recession. As soon as this period was over, economic growth entered the recovery phase (Gaidar 
(2005)). Over that period, GDP growth had been determined by the economic policies implemented 
along with a range of other factors, including the initial conditions (De Melo et al. (1997)), 
dynamics of exports and prices for raw materials, and government expenditures (Falcetti, Lysenko, 
and Sanfey (2006)). The recovery growth has been fed by the allocation effects unleashed by the first 
wave of reforms, exogenous factors and also – in some cases – initial conditions (Chubrik (2006)). 
Accordingly, the scope of adjustment can be explained by the scope of structural distortions a 
transition economy had been faced with. In its turn, the duration of adjustment is determined by the 
speed of market reforms. The U-shaped relationships between the speed of reforms and the duration 
and scope of adaptation recession have already been established in some earlier works on transition. 
It has been noted that the adaptation recession was short in the countries that implemented first-wave 
reforms rather quickly, but protracted in those countries that opted for a partial change of the 
previous system (Havrylyshyn (2001)). 
 
The following technical and theoretical problems should be taken into account while explaining 
output dynamics in post-socialist countries. First, the right-hand variables of the regression often 
have a different order of integration, which produces an unbalanced regression. Secondly, the 
theoretical considerations of simultaneous inclusion of traditional variables in the right-hand part of 
regression equations usually do not go beyond the explanation of growth by ‘stylized facts’. 
Thirdly, a negative influence of the initial conditions on growth decreases in time (Havrylyshyn, 
van Rooden (2000)), and this should be adequately taken into account while estimating appropriate 
regressions. In particular, the above-mentioned authors found a relationship between speed of 
adjustment of structural distortions and speed of market reforms that makes an incorrect 
simultaneous inclusion of these variables in regression. Lastly, the influence of initial conditions on 
economic growth can be positive as, for example, in the case of Belarus, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan (Chubrik (2006)). This creates additional problems while estimating the regression 
coefficients. 
 
In order to solve these problems, we suggest construction of the following variable: 
 
0,if 
,
,if 
B
B B
TT
RECOV
TT TT
≤ ⎧
= ⎨ −> ⎩
 (8) 
where TB is the last year of adaptation recession (exogenously determined); T is the current year. 
This variable characterizes the influence of factors which are effective in the period of recovery 
growth. In its turn, adaption recession is estimated by inclusion of the individual trends in the 
model. Thus, in this research we do not make an attempt to provide a theoretical explanation or an 
empirical investigation of other factors of economic growth apart from the market reforms. 
 
3.2. Dynamic properties of the data 
 
It has to be stressed that the vast majority of the studies on the subject tends to ignore the problem 
of dynamic characteristics of the data used. The papers by Staehr (2006) and Fish, Choudhry (2007) 
the indicators characterizing the level of economic reforms are tested for unit root; however these 
studies are devoted to analysis of the relationship between political and economic reforms. In 
addition, Staehr (2006) considers the EBRD index of market reforms as a stationary variable.
5 But 
in our view, the graphical depiction of this indicator (see Appendix A) both for individual countries 
                                                 
5 Despite such a result, the author also uses specifications of various models and tests assuming non-stationarity of the 
EBRD index of market reforms.   10
and on average for the entire sample suggests that the EBRD index of market reforms is probably a 
non-stationary variable. 
 
Table 3: Panel unit root tests 
 
EBRD gdppc  Test 
statistic  p-value statistic p-value 
H0: unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*)  –14.34  0.00  –5.04  0.00 
Breitung (t-statistic) 0.87  0.81  5.38  1.00 
H0: no unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri (Z-statistic) 11.38  0.00  12.39  0.00 
H0: unit root (assumes individual root process) 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (W-statistic) 0.72  0.76  –0.66  0.25 
ADF – Fisher (χ
2)  44.79 0.75  83.86  0.00 
ADF – Choi (Z-statistic) 4.57  1.00  0.91  0.82 
PP – Fisher (χ
2)
  33.87 0.98  99.79  0.00 
PP – Choi (Z-statistic) 4.95  1.00  0.15  0.56 
∆EBRD  ∆gdppc   
statistic  p-value statistic p-value 
H0: unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*)  –6.98  0.00  –4.05  0.00 
Breitung (t-statistic)  –7.80  0.00  –3.92  0.00 
H0: no unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
(Z-statistic) 5.31  0.00  5.23  0.00 
H0: unit root (assumes individual root process) 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (W-statistic)  –3.99  0.00  –2.23  0.01 
ADF – Fisher (χ
2)  105.13  0.00 68.56  0.06 
ADF – Choi (Z-statistic)  –3.59  0.00  –2.52  0.01 
PP – Fisher (χ
2)
  204.11  0.00  96.90  0.00 
PP – Choi (Z-statistic)  –8.88  0.00  –3.96  0.00 
Note. The calculations have performed by using EViews 5.1. The specifications of all tests included individual effects 
and individual linear trends. The choice of the lag length was made on the basis of modified Akaike information criteria 
with a maximum lag length equal to 3; The Newey-West bandwidth selection has been done by using a Bartlett kernel 
(see QMS (2005)). p-statistics for Fisher tests are computed by using an asymptotic χ
2 distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. The grey color indicates that unit root hypothesis is rejected (stationarity hypothesis is 
not rejected) at a 5% significance level. 
 
Since the time series for each of 26 countries are rather short (17 observations), we, following 
Staehr (2006), start the empirical analysis by testing the variables for unit root and stationarity. In 
Table 3 the results of the appropriate panel tests for unit root and stationarity (the review of used 
tests see in QMS (2005)) are presented. We used both tests with common and individual unit root 
process. The specifications of all tests included individual effects and individual linear trends. The 
choice of lag length in the corresponding tests was made automatically on the basis of modified 
Akaike information criteria with maximum lag length equal to 3; Newey-West bandwidth selection 
using Bartlett kernel is implemented. To visualize the results, the grey color in Table 3 indicates the 
cases when the unit root hypothesis is rejected (stationarity hypothesis is not rejected) at a 5% 
significance level. Although there are some contradictions in the results of panel tests for unit root 
and stationarity, the following conclusions can be formulated: 
 
1.  The level of the EBRD index of market reforms (EBRD) and a logarithmic level of real GDP 
per capita (gdppc) are the variables containing unit root. For the EBRD variable, a  unit root 
hypotheses is rejected only in one case out of eight (Levin-Lin-Chu test). For the gdppc variable, a 
unit root hypotheses is rejected in three cases out of eight. Besides the Levin-Lin-Chu test, the ADF 
– Fisher (χ
2) test and the PP – Fisher (χ
2) tests also reject the null hypotheses of unit root. However, 
a modification of these tests (ADF – Choi (Z-statistic) and PP – Choi (Z-statistic)) clearly indicates 
non-stationarity of the gdppc variable.   11
2.  The differences of the EBRD index of market reforms (∆EBRD) and the logarithmic 
differences of the level of real GDP per capita (∆gdppc) are stationary variables. For ∆EBRD only 
the Hadri test rejects the null hypotheses of stationarity. For ∆gdppc this test also rejects the 
stationarity hypothesis, the ADF – Fisher (χ
2) rejects unit root hypotheses only at a 10% 
significance level. In general, the tests applied suggest that ∆EBRD is a stationary variable in seven 
cases out of eight; ∆gdppc is stationary variable in six cases out of eight at a 5% significance level 
and in seven cases out of eight at a 10% significance level. 
 
Hence, panel unit root tests presented in Table 3 show that EBRD  and  gdppc are integrated 
variables with the order of integration I(1); ∆EBRD and ∆gdppc are stationary variables with the 
order of integration I(0). This means that a long-run relationship can exist between the level of real 
GDP per capita and the EBRD index of market reforms. This leads us to the application of panel 
techniques of cointegration analysis 
 
4. THE ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
4.1. Panel cointegration: Pedroni tests 
 
In the previous section it has been found that the level of real GDP per capita and the level of 
EBRD index of market reforms are the variables with an order of integration I(1). Therefore, a long-
run relationship between them can exist. According to the methodology proposed in the Section 2, 
this suggests the use of panel cointegration analysis. 
 
The main aim of this section is testing of the hypothesis that variables gdppc and EBRD are 
cointegrated. For that purpose, a method elaborated by Pedroni (1997; 1999; 2001)) for panel data 
in the framework single regression equation is applied. Specifically, Pedroni has suggested seven 
panel cointegration tests: four tests are the so-called within-dimension ones, three tests are between-
dimension ones. Within-dimension cointegration tests are statistics based on common 
autoregression coefficients in corresponding unit root for different countries (panel cointegration 
test). Between-dimension cointegration tests are simple averages from individual tests for different 
countries (panel group cointegration test). A null hypothesis of no cointegration is set for all seven 
tests. The alternative hypothesis assumes the existence of cointegration between examined 
variables. 
 
Given the dataset, we utilized Pedroni test for panel cointegration based on the equation (7): 
  ,, , , , α δβ ϕ ε =+ + + + it i i it it it gdppc T EBRD RECOV  (9) 
where i = 1, 2…26 (countries); t = 1989, 1990, …, 2005 (years). This specification assumes the 
existence of various aspects heterogeneity captured via the fixed individual effects  (αi),  and 
individual time trends (δiT). 
 
The cointegration test based on the equation (9) is calculated using the following regression: 
  ,, 1 , , it i it it u ε ρε − = +  (10) 
where  1 i i ρ =∀ ; H0: no cointegration;  i ρ is autoregression coefficient. 
 
The difference between panel and panel group test for cointegration follows from the specification 
of alternative hypothesis concerning the existence of cointegration: 
(i)  For panel cointegration test  01 :1 ; : 1 ii Hi H i ρ ρρ = ∀= < ∀ ; 
(ii)  For panel group cointegration test  01 :1 ; :1 ii Hi Hi ρ ρ = ∀< ∀ .   12
Thus, the panel group cointegration test is a more general test because it allows heterogeneity of the 
coefficients under an alternative hypothesis. 
 
The results of the panel cointegration tests are presented in Table 4. The specifications of all tests 
assumed the existence of deterministic constants and trends. The choice of a lag length has been 
done automatically on the basis of the modified Akaike information criteria with a maximum lag 
length equal to 2; the Newey-West bandwidth selection is applied by using a Bartlett kernel. In 
order to visualize the results, rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at a 5% a 
significance level is marked in grey (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Panel cointegration tests 
 
  Statistic  p-value Weighted  statistic p-value 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR-coefficients (within-dimension) 
Panel v-statistic  23.04  0.00  2.36  0.02 
Panel rho-statistic 1.08  0.22  2.36  0.02 
Panel PP-statistic  –4.89  0.00  –3.81  0.00 
Panel ADF-statistic  –6.77  0.00  –7.91  0.00 
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR-coefficients(between-dimension) 
Group rho-statistic 3.26  0.00     
Group PP-statistic  –5.45  0.00    
Group ADF-statistic  –7.18  0.00    
Note. The calculations have been performed by using EViews 6.0. H0: no cointegration. The specifications of the test 
assume the existence of deterministic constants and trends. The choice of the lag length was made on the basis of the 
modified Akaike information criteria with a maximum lag length equal to 2; the Newey-West bandwidth selection is 
done by using a Bartlett kernel. Grey color indicates the cases when the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 
5% significance level. 
 
As follows from Table 4, five tests out of seven reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between the level of real GDP per capita and the level of EBRD index of market reforms (null 
hypothesis is rejected if the statistics has a statistically significant negative value; v-statistics is an 
exception: in this case the null hypothesis is rejected, if the statistics has a statistically significant 
positive value). It should be noted that for small samples (in our case t = 26) group parametric t-
statistics (group ADF-statistics) is a more powerful test than other tests (Pedroni (1997)). This claim 
along with results obtained, lead to the conclusion of cointegration between the variables gdppc and 
EBRD. Therefore, there is a long-run relationship between the level of real GDP per capita and the 
level of EBRD index of market reforms. In its turn, the existence of cointegration between the 
variables gdppc and EBRD allows to use cointegrating regression (9) in order to estimate the 
parameters of long-run relationship. 
 
4.2. Estimation of long-run parameters 
 
In order to estimate the parameters of the long-run relationship we used regression equation (9). Our 
approach has the following peculiarities in the model specification: 1) the estimation of regression 
was carried out using pooled least squares (PLS); 2) the coefficients at the variables EBRD and 
RECOV are common for all countries; 3) the model assumes individual trends for different 
countries (a testable hypothesis); 4) the model assumes fixed effects (a testable hypothesis). 
Although utilization of PLS in estimation of the long-run equation can appear to be problematic, 
and fully modified least squares method in such case gives more reliable estimates (Pedroni 
(2001)), we aim to estimate the parameters of the long-run relationship using specification that 
corresponds as much as possible to the model used while testing for panel cointegration. 
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Table 5: Market reforms and economic growth: Long-run relationship (dependent variable: 
gdppc) 
 
Variables Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 
Constant  7.620 275.9 0.00 
EBRD  0.105 4.5  0.00 
RECOV  0.208 25.6  0.00 
  statistic  degree of freedom  p-value 
Redundant fixed effects tests: 
F-test 253.0  25,  388  0.00 
χ
2-test  1260.1 25  0.00 
Redundant individual trends test: 
F-test 42.0  26,  388  0.00 
Log likelihood ratio, χ
2  591.7 26  0.00 
Note. The calculations have been performed by using EViews 5.1. The model includes fixed effects and individual 
trends that are not shown in this table. The estimation method is pooled least squares (PLS). 
 
The estimated parameters of the long-run relationship between reforms and growth are provided in 
Table 5. It appears that the coefficient of the EBRD variable is positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the increase in the value of the EBRD index of market reforms 
positively affects economic growth in the long-run. A dummy variable characterizing the impact of 
recovery growth is also statistically significant and has an expected sign. The tests for redundant 
fixed effects and individual trends testify to the chosen specification of the model. Therefore, the 
equation of the long-run relationship between the level of real GDP per capita and the level of the 
EBRD index of market reforms in our specification is the following: 
  ,, , , 7.620 0.105 0.208 . it it it it gdppc EBRD RECOV ε =+ + +  (11) 
 
Cointegration between gdppc and EBRD assumes that the residuals of this regression (εi,t) are 
stationary, and these residuals with a lag 1 represent equilibrium correction mechanism adjusting 
gdppc to its equilibrium trajectory. The results of the formal tests of the residuals of cointegration 
relationship (11) for unit root are presented in Table 6.
6 These results show that the residuals of the 
regression equation (11) are a stationary variable. The residuals characterize an equilibrium 
correction mechanism that should be used while modeling the relationship ‘market reforms – 
economic growth’ both in the long-run and short-run (equilibrium correction model, ECM). 
 
Table 6: Equilibrium correction mechanism: Panel unit root test 
 
Test  Exogenous variables  Statistic  p-value 
H0: unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) no  –11.95  0.00 
H0: unit root (assumes individual root process) 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (W-statistic)  individual fixed effects  –4.55  0.00 
ADF – Fisher (χ
2)  no 228.92  0.00 
ADF – Choi (Z-statistic) no  –10.75  0.00 
PP – Fisher (χ
2)
  no 233.82  0.00 
PP – Choi (Z-statistic)  no –11.03  0.00 
H0: no unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri (Z-statistics) individual  fixed  effects  –0.60  0.73 
Note. The calculations have been performed by using EViews 5.1. The choice of the lag length was made on the basis 
of the modified Akaike information criteria with a maximum lag length equal to 2, in the tests without the individual 
effects and with maximum lag length equal to 3, in the tests with the individual effects; the Newey-West bandwidth 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, unit root tests whose results are presented in Table 6 are not tests for cointegration. Nevertheless, 
they unambiguously show that the residuals of equation (11) are stationary. This is an additional evidence of existence 
of cointegration between the level of real GDP per capita and the EBRD index of market reforms.   14
selection is implemented by using a Bartlett kernel (see QMS (2005)). p-statistics for Fisher tests are computed by using 
an asymptotic χ
2 distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
4.3. Cointegration and an estimation of the long-run parameters: An alternative approach 
 
In the previous section, a panel least squares is applied to estimate panel regression equation in 
order to estimate the parameters of the relationship between reforms and growth. Strictly speaking, 
this approach is valid as long as the regression coefficients for different countries are homogenous. 
Therefore, a somewhat more careful approach is needed to account for the difference in the short-
run dynamics across the countries studied. For that purpose, the approach originally suggested by 
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) has been applied. This approach allows simultaneously running the 
tests for cointegration between the variables and estimating the parameters of the long-run 
relationship. 
 
The approach is grounded in two methods of statistical estimation: (i) mean group estimations and 
(ii) pooled mean group estimations. The method of mean group estimations of the long-run 
parameters of the panel data takes an average value of the parameters of long-run relationships 
calculated for individual countries. The method of pooled mean group estimations is an 
intermediate technique between the mean group estimation (where the regression coefficients and 
constants are different for individual countries) and a regression with fixed effects (where the 
coefficients are fixed and only constants can vary). In the pooled mean group method only the 
parameters of the long-run relationship are the same for all countries in the panel, while the 
coefficients of the short-run dynamics can vary across countries included in the panel. 
 
The method of pooled mean group estimations can be applied to our data set in the following way. 
The autoregression model with a distributed lag without restrictions has the following form: 
  ,, ,
100
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This model can then be re-parameterized as an equilibrium correction model: 
 
,1 1 ,1 2 ,1
111
,, ,
111
()
,
it i i t i i t i i t
mnm
ij i t j ij i t j ij i t j i it
jjj
gdppc gdppc EBRD RECOV
gdppc EBRD RECOV u
θ ββ
φφγ µ
−− −
−−−
−− −
===
∆= + + +
+∆ +∆ +∆ + + ∑∑∑
 (13a) 
where β1i and β2i
 are the parameters denoting the long-run relationship; θi is a feedback coefficient, 
characterizing adjustment to the steady-state; the equilibrium correction mechanism (ECM) is in 
parentheses. 
 
The method of pooled mean group estimates imposes a limitation on (13a): the parameters of the 
long-run relationship β1i and β2i are the same for all countries in the panel. Then, the model can be 
described as follows: 
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In (13b) all the coefficients of the short-run relationship and the feedback coefficients can vary 
between individual countries. The estimations of the coefficients in this case are consistent and 
asymptotically normal both for variables with order of integration I(1) and variables with order of 
integration I(0). The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The lag length in   15
the model can be chosen on the basis of various information criteria or using the ‘general-to 
specific’ approach which reduced the model so to leave only statistically significant coefficients. 
The validity of utilization of polled mean group estimations can be determined by the Hausman test 
(null hypothesis – it is possible to use pooled mean group estimations (poolability)). 
 
The results obtained on the basis of model (13b) are presented in Table 7. First, the individual tests 
and joint Hausman test do not reject a null hypothesis of data poolability and validity of utilization 
of pooled mean group estimations. Thus, the results presented in Table 7, adequately describe our 
panel data. Second, the investigated variables are cointegrated, i.e. there is the long-run relationship 
between them. The negative and statistically significant at 1% level feedback coefficient (–0.318) 
for equilibrium correction mechanism confirms this. The coefficients of the long-run relationship at 
EBRD and RECOV are statistically significant and have expected signs. Moreover, the value of the 
coefficient at EBRD (0.114) is very close to the results obtained earlier within the static panel 
regression with fixed effects (0.105). The parameters of the short-run relationship in this case are 
not of special interest, although all of them are statistically significant, which follows from the 
method of lag selection in the model (‘general-to-specific’). Therefore, the two different methods 
do not contradict each other: they clearly indicate the existence of cointegration between the level 
of real GDP per capita and the level of the EBRD index of market reforms and the statistically 
significant influence of market reforms on economic growth in the long-run. Based on these results, 
we will use the equilibrium correction mechanism (εi,t), obtained in Section 4.2, for analysis of 
causality and endogeneity of investigated variables. 
 
Table 7: Cointegration test and estimation of the coefficients of the long-run relationship:  
The pooled mean group estimations (dependent variable: gdppc) 
 
Variables Coefficient  t-statistic  h-test  p- value 
The long-run coefficients: 
EBRD  0.114 5.87  0.87 0.35 
RECOV  0.092 30.33  0.84  0.36 
Joint Hausman test  0.88  0.64 
Equilibrium correction mechanism: 
ECM  –0.318 –4.40     
The short-run coefficients: 
Constant  0.040 0.67     
∆gdppct–1  0.271 3.76     
∆EBRD  –0.103 –2.31     
∆RECOV  0.097 4.11     
Note. The calculations have been performed by using Gauss 8.0, program JASA
7. The data for every country have been 
demeaned. The lag length has been chosen by using a ‘general-to-particular’ approach. As a result, the following 
autoregression model with the distributed lag has been selected: (1,0,0). The model is estimated by using a Newton-
Raphson algorithm. h-test: Hausman test. 
 
4.4. Analysis of causality and endogeneity: The short- and long-run aspects 
 
Since we have obtained results confirming the existence of the long-run relationship between 
investigated variables, the following analysis should be done in the framework of the equilibrium 
correction model allowing to consider the short-run and long-run aspects of the relationship ‘market 
reforms – economic growth’. Taken into account (7a) and (7b), the hypothesis for testing the 
following regressions will be used: 
  ,1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , , µ φγδ α −− − − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + it it it it it it gdppc gdppc EBRD RECOV ECM u  (14a) 
  ,2 2 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 1 2 , . µ φγ δ α −− − − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + it it it it it it EBRD gdppc EBRD RECOV ECM u  (14b) 
                                                 
7 http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran/jasa.exe.   16
 
On the basis of these regressions it is possible to reveal the direction of the relationships between 
variables both in the short-run and long-run (Granger tests), and to consider the problem of 
endogeneity (exogeneity) of the variables included in the model. The results of the estimations of 
the regressions (14a) and (14b) using panel least squares (model includes fixed period effects) are 
presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: The relationship between market reforms and growth: The short- and long-run 
dimensions (PLS) 
 
Dependent variable 
∆gdppc  ∆EBRD  Variables 
coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 
Constant –0.090  –7.775 0.000  0.145  4.480  0.000 
∆gdppct–1 0.323  4.790 0.000  0.240  1.610 0.108 
∆EBRDt–1 0.054 3.015 0.003  0.141  2.590  0.010 
∆RECOV 0.123  8.260  0.000  –0.054  –1.310 0.191 
ECMt–1 –0.387  7.004  0.000  –0.002  –0.012  0.990 
  statistic  degree of freedom p-value  statistic  degree of freedom  p-value 
Redundant fixed period effects tests: 
F-test  2.399  14, 371  0.003  3.608  14, 371  0.000 
χ
2-test 33.794  14  0.002  49.784  14  0.000 
Note. The calculations have been performed by using EViews 5.1. The model includes fixed period effects. The 
estimation method is the panel least squares (PLS). 
 
As it is shown in Table 8, market reforms influence economic growth both in the short-run and 
long-run. The first differences of the EBRD reform index (taken with a one year lag) positively 
influence real per capita GDP growth rates. The coefficient at the equilibrium correction mechanism 
is also statistically significant at a 1% level and has a ‘correct’ sign (minus). Its value means that 
adjustment of the dependent variable towards equilibrium takes approximately 2.5 years (1/0.378 = 
2.584). 
 
The results presented in Table 8 show that economic growth do not accelerate market reforms. In 
regression (14b) coefficients at the equilibrium correction mechanism and ∆gdppct–1 are statistically 
insignificant. This rejects the assumption of market reforms and economic growth endogeneity. 
According to the results obtained, the EBRD index of market reforms is a strictly exogenous 
variable relative to economic growth. 
 
The estimations of the coefficients of the regressions (14а) and (14b) can be inconsistent while 
using a panel least squares in the models containing both fixed effects and lags of dependent 
variables (Nickell (1981)). In this case there is an estimation bias of the order 1/t, where t is the 
length of the time series in the panel. To obtain more reliable results we additionally used the 
generalized method of the moments (GMM) for an estimation of the models (14а) and (14b). In our 
study the so-called system generalized method of moments (GMM-SYS) has been used (see 
Blundell, Bond (1998)). 
 
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 9. The tests show that the model is well 
specified: Sargan test revealed a validity of chosen instruments; additionally, the presence of the 
first order and absence of the second order autocorrelation also confirms the correctness of model 
specification. 
 
In general, the results obtained using GMM-SYS correspond to those presented in Table 8. The 
EBRD index of market reforms positively influences economic growth in the short-run (with a one 
year lag) and the long-run. Moreover, values of the coefficients in the equation for ∆gdppc are very   17
close to the values that have been obtained on the basis of panel least squares. As for a feedback, 
estimation of (14b) by GMM-SYS has not changed the results obtained earlier: economic growth 
does not influence market reforms neither in the long-run, nor in the short-run. 
 
Table 9: The relationship between market reforms and growth: The short- and long-run 
dimensions (GMM-SYS) 
 
Dependent variable 
∆gdppc  ∆EBRD  Variables 
coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 
Constant –0.098  –6.470  0.000  0.253 3.750 0.000 
∆gdppct–1 0.314  3.240 0.001  0.144 0.455 0.649 
∆EBRDt–1 0.074  2.580 0.010  0.180 1.670 0.095 
∆RECOV 0.131  7.770 0.000  –0.213 –2.710  0.007 
ECMt–1 –0.420  –3.930  0.000  0.037 0.135 0.893 
Transformation used: first differences 
GMM-SYS estimations: combined transformed and level equations 
Instruments for transformed equations: 
Transformed instruments: ECM; ECM(–2). 
Level instruments: Gmm(gdppc, 2, 99); Gmm(EBRD, 2, 99); Gmm(RECOV, 2, 99); Gmm(ECM, 2, 99). 
Instruments for level equations: ECM; ECM(–2); GmmLevel(∆gdppc, 1, 1); GmmLevel(∆EBRD, 1, 1); 
GmmLevel(∆RECOV, 1, 1); GmmLevel(ECM, 1, 1). 
Wald (joint): χ
2 (4) = 802.3[0.000]  Wald (joint): χ
2 (4) = 46.4[0.000] 
Wald (dummy): χ
2 (1) = 41.9[0.000]  Wald (dummy): χ
2 (1) = 14.0[0.000] 
Sargan test: χ
2 (534) = 24.4[1.000]  Sargan test: χ
2 (534) = 21.7[1.000] 
AR(1) test: N(0.1) = –2.1[0.032]  AR(1) test: N(0.1) = –2.9[0.003] 
AR(2) test: N(0.1) = 0.8[0.414]  AR(2) test: N(0.1) = 0.3[0.733] 
Note. The calculations have been performed by using PDP 1.24 of econometric software PcGive 10.3 (Doornik, Hendry 
(2001)). Wald (joint) is a joint test for significance of the variables in the model (H0: the variables are statistically 
insignificant); Wald (dummy) is a joint test for significance of dummies (constants) in the regression (H0: dummies are 
statistically insignificant; Sargan test is a test for the validity of the model instruments (H0: the instruments are valid in 
the model); AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests for autocorrelation of the first and second order, respectively (H0: no 
autocorrelation). In Table 8 the results (coefficients and tests) of the second step of GMM-SYS estimation are shown. 
The t-statistic is calculated using finite sample corrected standard errors. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study a new approach to the analysis of the relationship ‘market reforms – economic growth’ 
is put forward. Taken into account the dynamic characteristics of the data used (the level of real 
GDP per capita and the level of the EBRD index of market reforms), cointegration analysis has 
been chosen for investigation of this relationship. The usage of the equilibrium correction model 
has allowed getting some new results on the issue. 
 
Within our research we tested five main hypotheses and obtained the following results: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The logarithmic level of real GDP per capita and the level of the EBRD index of 
market reforms are non-stationary variables and have the order of integration I(1). Consequently, 
the first differences of these variables are stationary variables with order of integration I(0). 
 
Result. The set of panel tests for unit root and stationarity used in this research demonstrates that the 
investigated variables have an order of integration I(1). Their first differences are stationary 
variables. Thus, it would not be correct to utilize variables with different orders of integration in 
regressions characterizing the relationship ‘market reforms – economic growth’. This could lead to 
incorrect model specification. 
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Hypothesis 2. There is a cointegration between the logarithmic level of real GDP per capita and the 
level of the EBRD index of market reforms. 
 
Result. Utilization of different methods of analysis demonstrates that the level of real GDP per 
capita and the revel of the EBRD index of market reforms are cointegrated variables, i.e. there is the 
following long-run relationship between them (t-statistics in parentheses): 
,, (275.9) (4.5) (25.6) 7.620 0.105 0.208 . i t it it i t gdppc EBRD RECOV ε =+ + +  
Thus, increase in the index of market reforms has a statistically significant positive impact on GDP 
per capita dynamics in the long-run. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The relationship ‘market reform – economic growth’ can be described using an 
equilibrium correction model, characterizing the long-run and short-run aspects of this relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Market reforms have a statistically significant positive influence on economic growth 
in the short-run with a one year lag. 
 
Result. Within our study the following equilibrium correction model, characterizing the relationship 
‘market reform – economic growth’ has been obtained: 
,, 1 , 1 ( 7.775) (4.790) (3.015)
,1 ,1 1 , (8.260) ( 7.004)
0.090 0.323 0.054
0.123 0.387 .
it it it
it it it
gdppc gdppcy EBRD
RECOV ECM u
−− −
−− −
∆= − + ∆ + ∆ +
+∆ − +
 
As one can see, we have obtained a well-specified model confirming hypotheses 3 and 4. Market 
reforms have a statistically significant positive influence on economic growth in the short-run with 
a one year lag. The statistically significant coefficient at the equilibrium correction reflects the long-
run relationship between the variables and characterizes the speed of adjustment of the economic 
growth indicator towards a steady state. These hypotheses are validated by using different 
estimation methods of appropriate regressions. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Market reforms and economic growth are interrelated, i.e. the investigated variables 
are endogenous. 
 
Result. Within our methodology of analysis of the relationship ‘market reforms – economic growth’ 
the hypothesis concerning the exogeneity of investigated variables is not supported empirically. In 
accordance with obtained results, the EBRD index is a strictly exogenous variable relative to the 
indicator of economic growth. Thus, economic growth does not statistically significant influence 
market reforms; neither in short-run, nor in the long-run. 
 
In general, our results do not contradict recent studies on this issue (for example, Falcetti, Lysenko 
and Sanfey (2006)). Our main conclusion is that market reforms have a positive effect on economic 
growth in post-socialist countries. However, our econometric approach allows analyzing the 
relationship ‘market reforms – economic growth’ more correctly, as well as allows considering its 
various aspects (short-run and long-run dynamics) in more detail. In our opinion, this approach 
provides more intelligible results and may be used in comparable future research, for example, 
while analyzing the influence of various indexes of economic freedom on economic growth in all 
countries as a whole and in their different groups. 
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ANNEX A: DYNAMICS OF GDP AND EBRD REFORM INDEX 
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Figure 1. Albania 
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Figure 2. Armenia 
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Figure 3. Azerbaijan 
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Figure. 4. Belarus 
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Figure 5. Bulgaria 
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Figure 6. Croatia 
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Figure 7. Czech Republic 
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Figure. 8. Estonia   22
 
6.0
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
89 90 91 9293 94 95 96 9798 99 00 0102 03 04 05
1.00
1.33
1.67
2.00
2.33
2.67
3.00
3.33
3.67
4.00
4.33
gdppcGEO EBRDGEO (right axis)
Figure 9. Georgia 
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Figure 10. Hungary 
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Figure 11. Kazakhstan 
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Figure 12. Kirgizstan 
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Figure 13. Latvia 
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Figure 14. Lithuania 
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Figure 15. Macedonia 
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Figure 16. Moldova   23
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Figure 17. Poland 
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Figure 18. Romania 
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Figure 19. Russia 
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Figure 20. Serbia and Montenegro 
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Figure 21. Slovakia 
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Figure 22. Slovenia 
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Figure 23. Tajikistan 
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Figure 24. Turkmenistan   24
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Figure 25. Ukraine 
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Figure 26. Uzbekistan 
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ANNEX B: LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
MARKET REFORMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(GDPPC?) 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1989 2005 
Included observations: 17 
Cross-sections included: 26 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 442 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
Intercept 7.620  0.028  275.883  0.000 
EBRD? 0.105  0.023  4.470  0.000 
RECOV? 0.208  0.008  25.648  0.000 
ALB--@TREND –0.157  0.010  –15.976  0.000 
ARM--@TREND –0.159  0.013  –12.536  0.000 
AZE--@TREND –0.153  0.009  –16.586  0.000 
BLR--@TREND –0.130  0.008  –15.895  0.000 
BGR--@TREND –0.180  0.011  –17.109  0.000 
HRV--@TREND –0.168  0.009  –18.000  0.000 
CZE--@TREND –0.172  0.011  –16.278  0.000 
EST--@TREND –0.150  0.009  –15.807  0.000 
GEO--@TREND –0.187  0.015  –12.388  0.000 
HUN--@TREND –0.161  0.010  –16.311  0.000 
KAZ--@TREND –0.143  0.009  –15.470  0.000 
KGZ--@TREND –0.172  0.009  –18.429  0.000 
LVA--@TREND –0.168  0.011  –15.068  0.000 
LTU--@TREND –0.165  0.010  –16.809  0.000 
MKD--@TREND –0.161  0.011  –14.318  0.000 
MDA--@TREND –0.182  0.008  –21.562  0.000 
POL--@TREND –0.172  0.010  –17.447  0.000 
ROU--@TREND –0.191  0.011  –17.328  0.000 
RUS--@TREND –0.142  0.008  –18.497  0.000 
SCG--@TREND –0.184  0.009  –19.520  0.000 
SVK--@TREND –0.172  0.010  –17.167  0.000 
SLO--@TREND –0.171  0.010  –17.278  0.000 
TAJ--@TREND –0.166  0.008  –20.890  0.000 
TRK--@TREND –0.101  0.006  –17.142  0.000 
UKR--@TREND –0.132  0.007  –20.226  0.000 
UZB--@TREND –0.135  0.010  –13.160  0.000 
Effects Specification: Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
R-squared  0.992  Mean dependent var  7.401 
Adjusted R-squared  0.991  S.D. dependent var  0.954 
S.E. of regression  0.092  Akaike info criterion  –1.824 
Sum squared resid  3.270  Schwarz criterion  –1.325 
Log likelihood  457.198  F-statistic  891.597 
Durbin-Watson stat  0.703  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
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